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INTRODUCTION
Professor Marshall Shapo’s prodigious body of work, spanning several
distinct fields, provides no shortage of praiseworthy contributions.
Ironically, though, it is this same enormity of output that makes it effectively
impossible to do justice to it all. So, rather than be thorough or representative,
I select only one small subset of his publications in my own field of science
and the law to celebrate.
Professor Shapo is the first—and still the only—academic to explain
that by allowing untested chemical products onto the market we, as a society,
enable companies to experiment on unwitting humans to test drugs,
consumer products, workplaces, and environmental exposures. In a series of
books beginning in 1979, Professor Shapo placed this phenomenon of human
experimentation—what
he
sometimes
calls
“mass
market
experimentation”1—not only within tort, but also within the scope of
regulatory law.2 He mapped how legal institutions sometimes “compete” to
protect against these types of nonconsensual experiments, how they often
conflict,3 and how they sometimes fall short, leading to what he calls
“laissez-faire with a vengeance.”4 He even drafted an “injury law
constitution” that endeavors to extract the very best that this “jagged” body
of law has to offer public health and safety,5 while also offering some
normative principles to guide the law as it continues to develop over time.
In this Essay, I spotlight both how prophetic and how critically
important Professor Shapo’s four decades of writing on “humans as guinea
pigs” have become.6 His work is prophetic because he sees a coherent
problem that would have otherwise been ignored. His work is of enduring
importance because, despite Professor Shapo’s painstaking research, the
legal response to this experimentation has, if anything, become steadily
worse. The need for integrated legal solutions is growing even more urgent,
1
See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO, EXPERIMENTING WITH THE CONSUMER: THE MASS TESTING OF
RISKY PRODUCTS ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 6, 211–14 (2009) (exposing the widespread practice of
mass-market experimentation, where consumers are exposed to product risks that have been insufficiently
tested, often in deliberate ways, by manufacturers).
2
Id.; see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 5, 7 (1979) [hereinafter SHAPO, A
NATION OF GUINEA PIGS] (documenting the harmful effects of a number of prominent products, like DES,
and critiquing the legal system’s inadequate response to anticipating and preventing these harms);
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, at xi (2016) [hereinafter SHAPO, THE
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY] (tracing society’s varied responses to experimenting on humans which occurs
through exposure of persons to untested risks of new technologies without their permission).
3
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 92–93, 264 (2012); SHAPO, THE
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 314.
4
SHAPO, supra note 3, at 169.
5
Id. at 193.
6
See supra note 2.
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and his contributions on this subject will play a central role in locating
solutions.
In the first two parts of this Essay, I survey several foundational pieces
of Professor Shapo’s framing of the human experimentation problem. This
includes both the legal, normative principles that should guide technological
innovation, discussed in Part I, as well as practical evidence that these
principles are being violated, particularly in the production and use of
chemical-based products, explained in Part II. The third Part then explores
how the law seems to be absent from overseeing this human experimentation,
particularly for chemical-based products. Instead of deterring nonconsensual
human experimentation, existing laws actually reinforce these practices,
creating legally tolerated sanctuaries of human experimentation. The final
Part of this Essay applies Professor Shapo’s legal methods of interinstitutional analysis to locate better legal approaches to counteract
unreasonable human experimentation.
I.

IDENTIFYING THE UNDERLYING NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

In An Injury Law Constitution, Professor Shapo employs his mastery of
product liability law to inductively locate constitution-like principles that
generally represent the thrust of the common law’s normative goals for
public health and welfare.7 There are two principles from Professor Shapo’s
An Injury Law Constitution that are particularly instructive to understanding
the phenomenon of human experimentation. The first is the critical role of
law in encouraging socially beneficial innovation.8 The second is the need
for those engaged in risky activities (and innovations) to take responsibility
for anticipating and preventing unreasonable harm in settings where they are
better suited to assess long-term safety.9
When these two principles are combined, their “balancing” leads to a
relatively clear goal: that in the innovation and manufacture of complex
products, manufacturers should share some responsibility for the safety of
those products.10 Beneficial innovation, in other words, involves a reasonable
anticipation and prevention of unnecessary health and environmental harms
from new technologies. By factoring safety considerations into firms’
research and development (R&D) activities, the law thus helps guide
innovation in a positive, public-benefitting direction.11
7

SHAPO, supra note 3, at 268–72.
Id. at 169; SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at 254.
9
SHAPO, supra note 3, at 215, 269.
10
See, e.g., id. at 197.
11
See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at xv, 53, 259.
8
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This “injury constitution” also underscores the importance of living in
a world with these kinds of legal directives in place. If consumers were
responsible for testing and ensuring product safety in complex markets, then
not only would the consumers regularly encounter risks they cannot
reasonably understand or avoid, but manufacturers would be allowed to
innovate in ways that are largely blind to public safety.12 Rather than
conducting reasonable anticipatory research on safety, humans would
unwittingly become the experimental subjects.13
Instead, we expect the law to channel manufacturers towards socially
beneficial innovation. This could be done—among other ways—by placing
the burden on manufacturers to engage in reasonable research and
development of safer products and sanctioning them with tort liability and
regulatory penalties when they miss the opportunity to do so.14 Once the law
points innovative behavior in the right direction, it will also be easier for
consumers to evaluate competitor products and services with respect to
safety.
II. PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION WITHOUT
CONSENT
Despite enshrining these principles in an “injury constitution,”
Professor Shapo recognizes, and meticulously traces out, the vast, real-world
slippage occurring in practice, particularly with respect to chemical-based
products and activities that cause long-term harms.15 In a series of books
spanning more than three decades, Professor Shapo documents rampant
experimentation on humans—without their consent—that appears to be both
unreasonable and preventable through responsible premarket testing and
analysis.16 A small sampling of this much larger body of work includes the
following illustrations.
Chemical Manufacture. The area of chemical manufacture has long
been plagued by what seems to be rather stark evidence of underinvestment

12

See SHAPO, supra note 3, at 269–72.
Id. at 268–70.
14
See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 8, 129.
15
Other areas of this problematic experimentation that Professor Shapo documents, not spotlighted
in the text, include innovation on HIV/AIDs drugs, breast implants, Viagra, Estrogens, vaping, PFAS
chemicals, the birth control pill, the use of food and color additives, DES, asbestos, and gene technologies.
See generally SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2 (tracing harms caused by human
experimentation in the marketing of the birth control pill, nitrites, DES, asbestos, and recombinant DNA);
SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2 (examining human experimentation using a wide
range of products and activities that include prescription drugs, BPA, and hydrofracking).
16
See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 6–7 (cataloging different types of experimentation).
13
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in R&D on long-term safety.17 In the U.S., more than 40,000 chemicals are
sold that serve as ingredients for numerous consumer, industrial, and medical
products.18 Yet the toxicological understanding of this large universe of
chemicals and products is quite limited. According to a series of reports,
nearly two-thirds of all chemicals in commerce are insufficiently assessed
based on existing toxicological standards, and the remaining 10,000-plus
chemicals are supported by almost no safety data.19 Indeed, for thousands of
chemicals, independent researchers cannot even learn the name, much less
the chemical identity, of the chemical, due to overly generous trade secret
claims.20 Untested and unanalyzed chemicals thus flood the market, and their
potentially adverse effects on humans and the environment remain largely
unstudied.21
Nanotechnology. Despite the potential for health and environmental
harms stemming from nanotechnology, in which products are comprised of
man-made micro particles at the atomic scale, there is scant testing for their
potential latent hazards either pre- or post-market.22 As one former
government scientist summarized: “‘We have no information about chronic
exposure, or whether or not those materials have a delay of 10 or 15 years,’
like asbestos.”23 To remedy the regulatory agencies’ own ignorance on these
pivotal issues, the EPA requested that the industry voluntarily provide safety
data, but little information was produced.24 Instead, it appears that industry
17

See, e.g., SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at xv–xvii.
See TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory: How to Access the TSCA Inventory, EPA (2020),
https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/how-access-tsca-inventory [https://perma.cc/D5S4-7FAT].
19
See, e.g., STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY TOXIC CHEMS. FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING:
STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 118 fig.2, 119 (1984); Richard Judson, Ann Richard,
David J. Dix, Keith Houck, Matthew Martin, Robert Kavlock, Vicki Dellarco, Tala Henry, Todd
Holderman, Philip Sayre, Shirlee Tan, Thomas Carpenter & Edwin Smith, The Toxicity Data Landscape
for Environmental Chemicals, 117 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 685, 685 (2009).
20
Rob Coleman, Melanie Benesh & David Andrews, Off the Books II: More Secret Chemicals, EWG
(May 9, 2016), https://www.ewg.org/research/off-the-books-ii-more-secret-chemicals [https://perma.cc/
6XGZ-G5A8].
21
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-696T, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT AND EPA IMPLEMENTATION 13–14 (2013);
U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ENV-166, SCREENING AND TESTING CHEMICALS
IN COMMERCE 11 (1995).
22
See SHAPO, supra note 3, at 168–69; SHAPO, supra note 1, at 188–210; see also Health Risks of
Nanotechnology: How Nanoparticles Can Cause Lung Damage, and How the Damage Can Be Blocked,
SCIENCEDAILY (June 11, 2009), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090610192431.htm
[https://perma.cc/N4KQ-F9EM].
23
Sheila Kaplan, Nanotechnology: Harmful or Benign?, FLA. BULLDOG (July 24, 2013),
https://www.floridabulldog.org/2013/07/nanotechnology-harmful-or-benign/ [https://perma.cc/TCR9DX2F].
24
Id.
18
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investments in nanotechnology innovation prioritize the marketable benefits
of the technology rather than its safety. Moreover, since human exposures
are diffuse and almost impossible to track, the primary data we are able to
collect from human experimentation comes from highly exposed workers,25
which is largely produced by academics and government researchers rather
than by nanotech manufacturers.26
Fracking. Fracking, a technique used to tap difficult-to-reach natural
gas reserves, utilizes chemicals to facilitate the extraction processes. Existing
research on the long-term risks and harms associated with fracking in general
and fracking fluids in particular is slim and, again, is largely produced by
government and academic scientists outside of industry.27 At most, the
fracking industry has complied with the regulatory agencies’ requests to
provide data on spills and similar events during fracking processes, with the
government conducting the resulting health and safety research.28
Additionally, at least some of the chemicals used for extraction are trade
secret protected, making it difficult for third parties to evaluate the safety of
the chemicals with respect to the short and long-term risks, including those
risks associated with worker exposures and water contamination.29 As a
result, if fracking imposes risks to human health, we will likely learn of these
unwelcome effects from exposed populations after the fact.
Latent Harms in Consumer Products Such as Dietary Supplements,
Cosmetics, Fragrances, and Children’s Toys. There is similarly little
evidence of significant industry investment in R&D of the long-term safety
of consumer products that contain toxic substances with potential latent
hazards.30 As just one example, widespread public concerns about the latent
25
See, e.g., Thomas A.J. Kuhlbusch, Susan W.P. Wijnhoven & Andrea Haase, Nanomaterial
Exposures for Worker, Consumer and the General Public, 10 NANOIMPACT 11, 11 (2018).
26
See, e.g., Ira Bennett & Daniel Sarewitz, Too Little, Too Late? Research Policies on the Societal
Implications of Nanotechnology in the United States, 15 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 309–10 (2006).
27
See generally SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 33–40 (discussing
governmental and academic research conducted into fracking and the ways in which it conflicts with
industry research and rhetoric to form an uncertain understanding of surrounding risks).
28
The EPA, for example, has published several reports on the effects of fracking on drinking water.
See, e.g., EPA, EPA-600-R-16-236ES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES
(2016).
29
Neela Banerjee, Fracking Companies Keep 10% of Chemicals Secret, EPA Says, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/31032015/fracking-companies-keep-10chemicals-secret-epa-says [https://perma.cc/CG4D-TZ59].
30
See SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 115–31 (documenting misleading
representations and other unethical behavior by some product manufacturers regarding the risks of their
products); see, e.g., NANCY UDING & ERIKA SCHREDER, CHEMICALS REVEALED: OVER 5000 KIDS’
PRODUCTS
CONTAIN
TOXIC
CHEMICALS
1
(2013),
http://toxicfreefuture.org/wp-
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risks of bisphenol A (BPA), an industrial chemical used to make plastics, led
to considerable regulatory pressure (primarily from individual states) and
market pressure on manufacturers who, in turn, found it necessary to invest
in research and innovation on alternative plasticizers.31 Ironically, though,
these alternative plasticizers are largely untested and may lead to adverse
health effects as well.32 This same story can be retold for the substitute
products used in place of other known hazards, such as the PFAS-laden,
nonstick coatings used widely in cookware and a variety of other household
products.33
III. WHY IS THIS HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION OCCURRING?
Combining Professor Shapo’s normative principles in An Injury Law
Constitution with the disturbing evidence of mass market human
experimentation leads naturally to the diagnostic question: How is this
happening?
Professor Shapo’s analytical methods—which insist on examining the
legal system writ-large, rather than just one area, such as tort law, at a time—
point to at least one contributing explanation.34 The cumulative law, as
currently applied to latent chemical hazards, not only tolerates human
experimentation as the primary way to learn about chemical hazards, but may
actually be tacitly encouraging this approach. Indeed, even after a chemicalbased product or activity is sold in commerce, there are no incentives—and
potentially high costs in terms of financial liability and regulatory
consequences—for the creators of the technologies to collect post-market
data to learn about hazards or ways to improve the product. The law, in
content/uploads/2016/09/Chemicals_Revealed_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQE8-RTHM]; Maureen
Rice, Revealed . . . The 515 Chemicals Women Put on Their Bodies Every Day, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 20,
2009, 9:59 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/beauty/article-1229275/Revealed--515-chemicalswomen-bodies-day.html [https://perma.cc/55CT-DQZT].
31
See Mark J. Andreini, Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. & Paul M. Pohl, BPA, Phthalates, and the Law,
JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Mar. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/bpa_phthalates/ [https://perma.cc/4QW62E38].
32
LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD., PHTHALATES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES: HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 8 (2011), http://www.sustainableproduction.org/downloads/Phthalate
Alternatives-January2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYN3-AZGV].
33
See, e.g., Linda S. Birnbaum & Philippe Grandjean, Alternatives to PFASs: Perspectives on the
Science, 123 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. A104, A104 (May 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4421778/ [https://perma.cc/K7EU-3KZT]; Laura Castañón, What You Need to Know
About the ‘Forever Chemicals’ in Your Food, Water, and Air, NEWS@NE (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://news.northeastern.edu/2019/10/23/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-pfas-the-forever-chemic
als-in-your-food-water-and-air/ [https://perma.cc/RP2V-ZVVV].
34
See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at xiii; SHAPO, supra note 3, at 92–93;
SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at xiv, xvi–xvii, 288; Marshall S. Shapo, Changing
Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70’s, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 338–40 (1970).
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effect, creates a legal “sanctuary” for unconstrained human
experimentation.35
Before examining how the law may create these aggregate incentives,
the next Section provides a quick refresher as to why manufacturerinnovators are generally best situated to factor long-term safety
considerations into their R&D but might not be inclined to do so without
external legal pressure.
A. Is the Law Even Needed to Discourage Human Experimentation?
There are several practical reasons, beyond the normative principle that
Professor Shapo identifies, why it makes sense to place responsibility on
manufacturer-innovators to invest in reasonable research on the long-term
safety of their chemical-based products. First, and perhaps most important,
since manufacturer-innovators are engaged in the development of products,
incorporating safety considerations into the early stages of R&D is most
efficient. Certainly product development and marketing expenses can be
saved by creating safer products at this stage, before the product is prepared
for the market. Manufacturers are also uniquely suited to do this testing
because they can pass the costs of testing along to the final cost of their
products. And as the creators of new products, manufacturers also enjoy
superior access to understanding the potential risks and most useful types of
toxicological research. Finally, even post-market, manufacturers serve as the
central clearinghouse for consumer complaints, worker exposures, and other
chemical-related information and are thus best able to analyze and act on
emergent information on chemical hazards.
Yet, without legal intervention, market pressures and associated
reputational considerations are unlikely to adequately compensate
manufacturers for conducting research on the latent harms of their chemical
products.36 Conducting in-house research to identify long-term health
hazards can be costly, and, even after the investment, the research may still
be inconclusive.37 This research can also take time, which further delays
marketing and profits. And chemical manufacturer–innovators have few to
no market benefits to offset these costs; even if the manufacturer does
rigorous five-star safety assessments as part of its R&D, consumers will
likely discount this extra effort as “green-washing” because consumers have
35
See generally SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2 (documenting this
unconstrained human experimentation by manufacturers and other industrial risk-creators in a number of
illustrative areas of market activity).
36
See WENDY WAGNER, INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 135–36 (2019).
37
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 784–85, 788–89 (1997).
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no way to validate the quality and rigor of the manufacturer’s assessments.38
Finally, market intermediaries, like lenders and insurers, also face high costs
in validating manufacturers’ self-assessments and comparing this
information against competitor products.39 Without market rewards for these
assessments, the least expensive (and perhaps the most risky) products will
fare the best, leading to a classic market for lemons.40
B. The Legal Sanctuary for Human Experimentation
Based on these general market features with respect to latent hazards, it
seems clear that the law is needed to counteract the rational incentives of
manufacturer–innovators to neglect, or even ignore, long-term safety
considerations in the course of technological innovation.41
So how is the law abdicating its role and failing to place primary
responsibility on manufacturers for considering safety in chemical
innovation? Tort and regulatory law are considered in turn.
1. Tort Law
At first glance, we would expect tort law to create strong incentives for
manufacturers to ensure the reasonable safety of their products. Tort doctrine
imposes liability for negligent activities, which would seem to encompass
deliberate, nonconsensual experimentation on humans. In fact, scores of
successful plaintiffs have demonstrated the strength of tort law in product
cases, holding manufacturers liable for a range of dangerous chemical
products that involve acute hazards.42 Liability has also been periodically
imposed on manufacturers for some long-term chemical-based harms. For
example, consider the bankrupting effects of tort liability on asbestos
manufacturers and the costly waves of litigation against the manufacturers
of DES, lead paint, tobacco, and others.43
38

Leyla Acaroglu, What is Greenwashing? How to Spot It and Stop It, MEDIUM (July 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/disruptive-design/what-is-greenwashing-how-to-spot-it-and-stop-it-c44f3d130d5
[https://perma.cc/XJ4B-LWB8]; Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity:
Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1814 (1989) (“Buyers’ inability to
screen products removes any incentive for manufacturers to differentiate between toxic and nontoxic
products and to screen before production . . . . [and so] as long as the information market remains
undeveloped, ignorance of toxicity may be an advantage to a product.”).
39
See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 137–38.
40
See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1814 n.72.
41
See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at 244. There is a general sense, in
other words, that for these long-term risks, “uncertainties should be resolved against the creators of
potential danger” and at a minimum, “those who experiment on consumers . . . must let the consumers
know that they are experimental animals.” Id. at 250–51.
42
See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Exposure, and
Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 470–82 (2004).
43
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 37, at 821–25.
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Yet, as several scholars have noted, to file a case, the victim–plaintiff
must also produce some scientific evidence that the product actually caused
his or her harm. It is therefore the plaintiff who bears the burden of
introducing sufficient expert evidence to prove that the defendant’s product
or action was more probably than not a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.44
This basic pleading requirement creates a catch-22 in latent injury
litigation. To press forward, the plaintiff must present credible evidence that
the product was capable of doing the long-term harm they are alleging. But
that burden undermines the safety incentives on manufacturers; the less
testing conducted by the manufacturer-defendant, the more likely that
defendant will be spared liability, at least without an independent body of
incriminating third-party research.
Indeed, over the last few decades, rather than becoming more forgiving
with regard to this problematic burden of causation, some courts have
become increasingly demanding in requiring rigorous scientific evidence
supporting plaintiffs’ allegations before proceeding to trial.45 An evidentiary
screening step—a Daubert hearing—presents perhaps the most significant
impediment to latent harm cases.46 Under Daubert, defendants can file
motions in limine, which seek to exclude some or all of plaintiffs’ expert
testimony on causation, arguing that it is not scientifically reliable. These
motions are especially successful in cases where there is no conclusive
epidemiological research and plaintiff experts must inductively synthesize
different bodies of evidence (e.g., case studies, pharmacological evidence,
and animal studies) to support a potential causal link.47 Indeed, in a few
jurisdictions, some district courts have attempted to go even further and
actually insist on human evidence as a necessary predicate to a showing of
causation in tort.48
Mass litigation in asbestos, lead paint, DES, Dalkon Shield, Agent
Orange, and C8 (used in Teflon), to name a few, uniformly showcases how
the evidence needed to support private tort cases typically comes from
experimentation on unconsenting humans.49 In Professor Shapo’s terms, this
44
See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 331 (1992); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
45
See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597–98.
46
See SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, 209–15; Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey,
Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 314–16 (2007).
47
See, e.g., Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ evidence as speculative where it extrapolated from studies of similar drugs and animal studies).
48
See, e.g., Arthur H. Bryant & Alexander Reinert, Epidemiology in the Legal Arena and the Search
for Truth, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY S27, S29 (2001).
49
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 37, at 818–19. See generally ROBERT BILOTT, EXPOSURE (2019)
(discussing the human evidence underlying our understanding of C8).
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means that the courts are sometimes requiring nonconsensual human
experimentation as a condition to tort liability.
The benefits of ignorance regarding latent hazards are even more
evident in cases where the plaintiffs’ claim survives dismissal and the
plaintiffs can access the industry’s internal files during discovery. During
this discovery, plaintiffs often learn of what Professor Shapo calls “red flag”
evidence, which reveals that a manufacturer–defendant was alerted to
potential long-term risks but chose to ignore these red flags while
simultaneously suppressing them from public view.50 This internal evidence
often plays a central role in explaining plaintiff verdicts, especially in cases
with weak causation evidence, because it underscores the defendant’s
unreasonable behavior.51
On the other hand, from the manufacturers’ point of view, these red
flags also inculcate the wisdom of an “ignorance is bliss” approach to testing
and tracking latent product hazards. From these cases, manufacturers learn
that resisting any testing and innovation insulates them from tort liability,
but partial testing and presumably well-intended efforts to identify safer
substitutes can trigger a barrage of legal vulnerabilities that can ultimately
lead to bankrupting litigation. Professor Sanders observes that in these
settings, the ability of firms to conduct research after litigation becomes a
“lose-lose proposition” because “[i]f they showed an effect, the studies
would be used against the company,” and if they did not, “[a]ny slight
technical flaw in the design or execution of the experiment would be
exploited by plaintiffs to undermine [the defendant’s] findings.”52
By contrast, a manufacturer that knows nothing and learns nothing
about its product faces lower risks of liability. Of course, this makes human
experimentation still more problematic since it means that not only are
unwitting humans exposed to under-tested hazards, but their injuries are not
even monitored to allow society to learn about the human hazards caused by
new technologies.
2. Regulatory Law
But, as Professor Shapo reminds us, there is a larger institutional setting
within which tort law operates.53 One might assume that the reams of laws
50

SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 69, 127–29.
See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 263, 289 (1996); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The
Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53–56 (1993); Fredric L. Ellis &
Ernest Hornsby, Letter to the Editor, Dow Chemical Hid Truth on Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1995, at A24.
52
Sanders, supra note 44, at 337.
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and regulations governing chemical-based hazards fill in these legal gaps and
encourage manufacturers to conduct rigorous premarket testing and institute
rigorous post-market tracking and analyses. Accordingly, tort law would
serve primarily a prophylactic role, providing compensation in cases where
there is fraud or other particularly egregious conduct by the manufacturers.
Unfortunately, despite more than one hundred pages of statutory text
that seems to suggest otherwise,54 chemical regulatory oversight in the
United States barely engages in the regulation of chemicals or chemicalbased consumer products (except drugs and, to some extent, pesticides).55
Under these regulatory programs, there are few to no requirements on
manufacturers for pre- and post-market testing and data analysis. And this
limited government oversight remains fully in place despite a widely
acclaimed legislative overhaul of the chemical regulatory program in 2016.56
Specifically, as a matter of U.S. law, manufacturers of chemicals bear
no burden for affirmatively analyzing or testing the safety of their chemicals,
except when they are given explicit testing orders by the EPA (a process
which manufacturers can oppose in court).57 Manufacturers are required by
law to submit case reports of adverse effects they are aware of that occur
post-market (e.g., red flag evidence).58 However, even with these mandated
notifications, manufacturers are not required to evaluate the adverse effects
or even submit the information to the regulators in a way that makes it easy
for regulators to analyze.59
Thus, rather than place responsibility for anticipatorily testing or
assessing the long-term safety of chemicals on manufacturers, the
responsibility is left to regulators.60 Without data to analyze, regulators
essentially must guesstimate which of the 40,000 largely untested and

54
See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012) (chemical substances);
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2012); Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA),
15 U.S.C. § 2082 (2012) (consumer products).
55
See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 138–39.
56
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448
(2016).
57
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.45(a), 720.50(a)–(b) (2019) (listing the information required for new
chemicals, which includes only “known” information about hazards); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
58
15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (2012).
59
In response to this requirement, manufacturers in fact sometimes send all raw data—even data
having no bearing on hazards—to understaffed regulators. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal
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Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 146 (2004).
60
See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 130–49.
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unanalyzed chemicals sold in commerce are likely to be dangerous.61 And it
is up to regulators to assemble risk assessments for each worrisome chemical
selected out of the larger list. This means that for each suspect chemical,
regulators—rather than the chemical manufacturers—must evaluate the
scientific literature, order manufacturers to do specific toxicity tests on a
case-by-case basis, and conduct regulatory evaluations to assess whether the
combined exposure and toxicity of a worrisome chemical presents an
unreasonable risk.62 The manufacturers’ primary role, by contrast, is limited
to submitting comments critiquing the regulators’ efforts and ultimately
challenging a regulatory assessment in court if a manufacturer finds an
assessment or restriction to be unsatisfactory.63
Moreover, even in the rare case that an individual chemical is ultimately
identified as potentially hazardous and restricted in some way,64
manufacturers may simply substitute other untested chemicals in its place.65
The cycle then begins anew. It is once again up to the regulators to learn
about whether these new chemical substitutes are hazardous and, if the
information is lacking, to order additional testing. No wonder we see
worrisome substitutions occurring for hazardous chemicals like BPA and
PFAS in the chemical market.66
With the aggregate burden on regulators for assessing latent chemical
hazards, the incentives for factoring long-term safety considerations into
manufacturing practices are set in reverse.67 Much like the incentives created
by tort law, rational manufacturers will find that the most expedient and least
expensive way to navigate the regulatory requirements is to forgo safety
testing, internal risk assessments, and active post-marketing tracking of longterm risks. Internal due diligence by manufacturers again creates a lose-lose
proposition that triggers greater, rather than less, regulatory oversight and
61
See TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory: How to Access the TSCA Inventory, supra note 18. For
an accessible summary of EPA’s regulatory requirements, see Highlights of Key Provisions in the Frank
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/assessing-andmanaging-chemicals-under-tsca/highlights-key-provisions-frank-r-lautenberg-chemical
[https://per
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62
Id.
63
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64
Only five chemicals have been banned since 1976. Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond:
Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1830 (2009).
65
See, e.g., Steve C. Gold & Wendy E. Wagner, Filling Gaps in Science Exposes Gaps in Chemical
Regulation, 368 SCI. 1066, 1067–68 (2020); Philippe Grandjean, Delayed Discovery, Dissemination, and
Decisions on Intervention in Environmental Health: A Case Study on Immunotoxicity of Perfluorinated
Alkylate Substances, 17 ENV’T HEALTH 62, 62 (2018).
66
See, e.g., Birnbaum & Grandjean, supra note 33, at A104.
67
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448 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(2) (2018)).
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restrictions. Unstructured experimentation on humans (and the environment)
becomes the primary way for society to learn about chemical hazards.68
In sum, existing law creates a protected sanctuary that allows and even
encourages human experimentation in lieu of responsible testing and
analysis of unreasonable chemical hazards. Humans not only serve as the
unwitting guinea pigs, but their sacrifices are also generally not dignified
with systematic data collection in an effort to identify possible hazards postmarket. Moreover, the growing number of synergistic and cumulative
reactions from multiple unanalyzed chemical products makes the ability to
learn from human experimentation still less likely.69 Ironically, the greater
the number of untested hazards that human guinea pigs are exposed to, the
more difficult it will be for scientists to learn about individual product risks
post-market.
IV. NEXT STEPS
As Professor Shapo observes, “the power of experimenters to control
risk, and . . . the ignorance and helplessness of victims[]replicate themselves
in many environments” and warrant more coherent legal intervention.70 So
what to do?
At a general level, “[t]he experimental society needs mechanisms that
enable government to get out in front of problems identified with all kinds
of experimentation.”71 Responsibility must be placed on manufacturers to
incorporate safety considerations into their innovative processes for
chemical-based products. And, if manufacturers fail to do this, the legal
consequences must be far greater than the benefits manufacturers enjoy by
proceeding in ignorance.
Both regulatory and tort adjustments are needed, but an overhaul of
chemical regulation is of highest priority, since proactive regulation has the
potential to be the most direct, enforceable, and comprehensive solution.
Consistent with Professor Shapo’s normative principles, the nature of this
general reform would be straightforward: before keeping or releasing a
chemical product on the market, the manufacturer must be required, at least,
to rigorously assess the long-term risks based on the existing available
information.72 Manufacturers should also be tasked with collecting and
68
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See Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2332–37 (2017)
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71
Id. at 40.
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assessing post-market data continuously in order to monitor unexpected
hazards. These adjustments fully comport with Professor Shapo’s An Injury
Law Constitution.73 While humans may continue to serve in some settings as
the unwitting subjects of post-market experimentation, manufacturers will at
least be required to limit this role to hazards that cannot be reasonably
anticipated or prevented.
To ensure the manufacturers’ safety assessments are reliable, technical
rules are also needed to dictate the terms of scientifically acceptable risk
analyses and testing.74 For example, the manufacturers should be required to
use standardized protocols and computational models that have been
designed by prominent expert panels. And manufacturers must be required
to compare their products against the safest substitutes and explain the
resulting findings in scientifically rigorous yet accessible ways. Regulatory
requirements in both Europe and California have already moved in this
general direction;75 although, to be effective, regulatory oversight must be
still more demanding.
Any reformed regulatory program, however, necessarily runs the risk
of leaving gaps—for example, perhaps regulators will fail to implement or
enforce these requirements or will overlook an unreasonably dangerous
chemical for a variety of reasons. As we have learned from the last century,
these inevitable cracks in regulatory oversight provide a central reason why
it is important to keep state tort law in place, without any preemption.76
Accordingly, expansions and adjustments to the common law, in theory, are
also needed.
Some courts have attempted to address the perverse incentive problem
in tort law by adjusting the plaintiffs’ causation burden in a subset of cases
where there is strong evidence that the defendant–manufacturers
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unreasonably exposed a plaintiff to untested but potentially significant
exposures.77 However, thus far, these trial-and-error adjustments to the
causation requirement still yield a risk of too many false positives in favor
of plaintiffs, with a credible risk of unwarranted, opportunistic litigation.78
As a result, adjustments to the remedies (and associated claims)
available in tort law are better suited to offer promising reforms to this
challenge. For example, Professor Alexandra Lahav isolates a “knowledge
remedy” that has been made available in several cases and could become
more routine in the future.79 Rather than providing victims with
compensation for harm or even medical monitoring, a knowledge remedy
provides unconsenting victims of chemical risks with injunctive-type relief
that requires the manufacturer to conduct reasonable research on the hazards.
This court-mandated testing can then seed more lucrative injury claims down
the road. This ingenious proposal would likely still be limited to hazards that
appear to cause human harms, but the additional deterrent could add more
counterweight to the existing legal incentives that favor human
experimentation.
Along these same lines, public nuisance claims—filed by government
entities that aggregate the human hazards in their jurisdiction traced to a
particular unreasonable hazard—are capable of side-stepping some of the
causal difficulties faced in individualized suits. For example, the City of San
Francisco succeeded in obtaining compensation from two paint companies
for the remediation of hazardous (but undisclosed) lead paint in buildings
throughout the city dating back to the mid-1900s.80 In a similar vein, the
Attorney General of Oklahoma succeeded against Johnson & Johnson at the
trial level in a public nuisance claim seeking compensation for the state’s
public health expenses resulting from opioid addictions traced to careless
marketing practices by the company.81

77
See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To say that [the
defendant’s drug] caused [the plaintiff’s] injuries is only half the story, however. In order for the causation
requirement to be met, a trier of fact must be able to determine . . . that the defendant’s negligence was
responsible for the injury.”).
78
See, e.g., Williams v. Utica Coll. Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 120–22 (2d Cir. 2006)
(significantly narrowing the causation test propounded in Zuchowicz).
79
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Knowledge Remedy, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1366–75 (2020).
80
See Joshua Schneyer, California Settles Decades-Long Lawsuit Over Lead Paint, but Outcome Is
Bittersweet, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-leadcalifornia/california-settles-decades-long-lawsuit-over-lead-paint-but-outcome-is-bittersweet-idUSKCN
1UC2H5 [https://perma.cc/2RX6-ZK7K].
81
See John Culhane, The Little Known Legal Doctrine Making Big Pharma Pay for the Opioid Crisis,
POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/28/johnson-and-johnsondecision-opioids-227913 [https://perma.cc/9MHU-44UW].

337

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Ultimately, the most effective reforms will entail a combination of both
tort and regulatory law, consistent with the “New Torts” identified by
Professor Shapo back in 1970.82 A temporary amnesty for manufacturers
from all legal sanctions may be needed for several years while they
incorporate long-term safety considerations into their products and practices.
Other adjustments may be necessary as well to shift the equilibrium in favor
of manufacturer responsibility for unreasonable chemical hazards. However
the reforms are crafted, some relatively radical changes to existing law seem
necessary in the short-term.
CONCLUSION
Professor Shapo’s work illuminates a complicated thicket of liability
and regulatory rules that create perverse incentives for human
experimentation in the manufacture of chemical-based products. Only by
mapping out these overlapping legal programs and tracing how they affect
the incentives of manufacturers can we see how current laws perversely
tolerate and even encourage human experimentation in areas of chemicalbased products. While there is still a long way to go in collapsing this
sanctuary for human experimentation, Professor Shapo has forged a path
through the legal forest. All we need to do is follow it to the end.
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